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Pan-Africanism, Continental Identity, and                                        
African Foreign Policy since 1945 
 
By Olufemi Babarinde and Stephen Wright  
 
Seventy years have passed since the October 1945 Pan-African Congress in 
Manchester, United Kingdom, helped to chart a common course and cause for Africa’s 
independence. Many of the immediate goals of the Congress were achieved over the 
following two decades, notably with the ending of formal colonization and the 
independence of most of the continent, and also with the establishment of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. The 1945 Congress in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War is used as the starting point to frame this 
examination of Pan-Africanism, continental identity, and foreign policy over the ensuing 
seventy years. We examine how this historical evolution shapes contemporary 
prospects for and pursuit of a coordinated foreign policy for the continent. 
It is a challenge to postulate a common identity and foreign policy for a continent 
of one billion people in fifty-five countries with some 1,000 ethnicities, with a landmass 
three times the size of China or the United States, and six times the size of Europe. 
Should we expect to find a shared identity or policy, or is it even practical for the 
continent to aspire to this? Is there evidence that the continent is actually motivated to 
pursue such continental goals? In the 1960s, there was some semblance of unity of 
purpose and continental identity among African political leaders at the OAU, with broad 
policies around the desire for independence, goals of nation building, and plans for 
economic rejuvenation and growth. Hostility to remaining colonial outposts and to the 
apartheid regime in South Africa helped to unify the continent against these common 
enemies. But such policies masked deep disagreements among African leaders even at 
this early stage.1 
These stresses and inconsistencies continue to shape and influence outcomes, 
especially with regard to a continental union and foreign policy. We address African 
identity and a continental foreign policy within theoretical, political, historical, and policy 
perspectives. We weigh successes and failures of policy, ask whether the pursuit of a 
common foreign policy is a reasonable or achievable goal, and analyze aspects of 
current African policy in a number of global arenas. We conclude by assessing what we 
think are potential outcomes, and whether further unity around shared policies within the 
continent is likely and feasible given the events of the past seventy years. This 
discussion is timely in light of the launch in 2015 of negotiations toward a continental 
free trade area, the development of a tripartite free trade area in eastern and southern 
                                            
1 Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1989). 
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Africa, and ongoing attempts to invigorate continental cooperation through the African 
Union, and these topics are analyzed in depth in this paper. 
Constructing African Identity and Foreign Policy 
What is Africa? That is a question that could absorb us for a long time, but we will only 
address a few pertinent issues, drawing upon ideas from social constructivism. 
According to this theory, reality is constructed by ideas, norms, and debate rather than 
something that has a fixed or permanent existence. Norms are essentially standards of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given or specific identity.2 Arguably, there can be 
no such thing as a permanent African identity, as this is fluid and open to social 
construction. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a single identity for a vast continent 
with different ethnicities, religions, historical experiences, and nationalities. Ali Mazrui 
examined the fragmentation of African identity along a variety of axes: North-South, 
ethnicity, ideology, religion, language; and yet the impact of colonization served to 
provide a basis and urgency for common policies.3 Africans have tried to share common 
experiences and set common goals, both in the past and the present. However, for 
much of the post-independence era, it has been difficult to fuse these multiple narratives 
to forge a common identity and continental policy toward the outside world, and we 
consider the ongoing challenges today to that endeavor. 
The Second World War provided a catalyst for greater urgency to promote Pan-
African solidarity and purpose, strengthened by the experience of several hundred 
thousand Africans fighting in the war.4 Pan-Africanism provided a unifying identity for 
protest across the black world, with congresses having taken place since 1919.5 Mazrui 
identified five dimensions of Pan-Africanism, highlighting the heterogeneous nature of 
this identity: sub-Saharan, trans-Saharan, trans-Atlantic, West-hemispheric, and global. 
He also saw Pan-Africanism both as a movement of liberation and a movement of 
integration.6 Before 1945, Pan-Africanism had been led by American and West Indians 
outside of the continent, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, and Marcus 
Garvey. 
The 1945 Pan-African Congress differed from previous congresses, which had 
had a more fluid transnational theme, by focusing specifically on shaping a platform for 
African nationalism and cultural consciousness within Africa, and galvanizing a radical 
agenda in the continent for the following decade or more. More specifically, the 
Manchester Congress was the first to be organized primarily by Africans, the first to be 
                                            
2 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, 4 (1998), 887–917.  
3 Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition (London: Heinemann, 1980). 
4 Vincent B. Khapoya, The African Experience, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2013); 
Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
5 Previous to 1945, Pan-African Congresses took place in Paris (1919), London and Brussels 
(1921), London and Lisbon (1923), and New York (1927), virtually all of which involved W.E.B. Du Bois. 
6 Ali A. Mazrui, Africa’s International Relations (London: Heinemann, 1977). 
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attended by significant numbers of Africans living and studying in the UK and by 
delegates from Africa, and the first to have a specific focus on the decolonization of 
Africa.7 In other words, in addition to having future African leaders attend such as Jomo 
Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, and Hastings Banda, the conference included numerous 
delegates from African labor unions, youth groups, and political associations, even 
though African delegates were still outnumbered by colleagues from the diaspora. The 
call to action at the Congress helped foster African and Pan-African unity centered upon 
the drive for the independence (as opposed to simply self-rule) of the continent “free 
from foreign imperialist control,” and although it was “an obscure meeting in a northern 
English town, attended by earnest but obscure black people,” it was a conference 
pointing to future potential of the continent as perceived by Mazrui when he wrote that it 
was “pregnant with destiny.”8 The independence of India, the jewel in the British crown, 
in 1947 gave further impetus and constructed self-belief to Africans pushing for their 
own independence. Nevertheless, significant fluidity and uncertainty remained in how 
specific paths forward would develop as colonies sought to redefine and reimagine their 
relationships with European colonial powers.9 
Ghanaian independence in 1957 marked the beginning of a relative sprint to 
independence (with important exceptions) across Sub-Saharan Africa. In December 
1958, President Nkrumah hosted the first All-African People’s Conference in Accra, 
attended by representatives from twenty-eight African countries, and this was the first 
intergovernmental conference of its type to be held on African soil. That conference 
pushed for the independence of the whole continent, the creation of unity and 
community between African states, and the economic and social reconstruction of 
Africa. Francophone African leaders had not played significant roles before 1958 in 
these conferences, but through the writings of Léopold Senghor and Cheikh Anta Diop, 
the concept of negritude was promoted as a way to separate the African experience and 
identity from the European.10 
As African countries became independent, perceptions and construction of Pan-
African solidarity began to shift from aspirations of continental liberation to policies of 
national sovereignty, where the urgency of nation building conflicted with the desire for 
continental union. This was evident in the early 1960s in the debate over the structure 
that future African cooperation would take. Although a handful of leaders, led by 
Nkrumah, called for a unified African continent with a single currency and monetary 
                                            
7 Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, eds., The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited 
(London: New Beacon Books, 1995); also Basil Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History 
(London: Longman, 1989). 
8 Mazrui, Africa’s International Relations, 83. 
9 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 
1945–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
10 Léopold S. Senghor, “Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century,” in Roy R. Grinker, 
Stephen C. Lubkemann, and Christopher Steiner, eds., Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, 
History, and Representation, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 477–83. Cheikh Anta Diop, 
“The Meaning of Our Work,” in Grinker et al., 44-47. 
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zone, an African central bank, a unified African foreign policy, distribution of wealth from 
richer to poorer regions, and African citizenship and identity (the Casablanca group), the 
vast majority (Brazzaville/Monrovia group) favored a moderate approach accepting the 
status quo of the colonial demarcation of territorial boundaries. This latter group favored 
sovereignty and opposed redistributive plans for wealthier regions to help the 
development of the poorer.11 European colonial powers were also uniformly opposed to 
anything that smacked of continental unity, preferring to retain influence over the newly 
independent states and keep them in their corner during the Cold War.12 Where France 
did cultivate some unity of purpose, such as in francophone West Africa, it was explicitly 
to counterbalance and undermine the perceived strength of Nigeria.13 
The establishment of the OAU in 1963 entrenched by design national interests 
over continental aspirations, even though that may appear to be counter-intuitive. Pan-
Africanist internationalism was undermined by the surge of African nationalism. 
Divisions based on language, religion, and ethnicity were manipulated by elites in many 
countries to maximize patrimonial power and control over the state. 14  European 
governments remained influential in shaping Africa’s external relations, and economies 
largely maintained a commodity-based, export-oriented profile with underdevelopment 
perpetuated. Despite the continental arena provided by the OAU, most states’ foreign 
policy was heavily focused on relations with near neighbors, along with opposition to 
white-ruled South Africa and, earlier, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, though trade patterns 
remained linked to partners external to the continent. In reality, the capacity of most 
states to influence any real policy issues beyond their border was severely limited.15 
Weakness in terms of continental identity and policy continued in the 1980s and 
1990s with the rise of neoliberal policies instituted by the twin agencies of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), aided and abetted by powerful 
Western interests.16 Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were instituted in many 
                                            
11 Olatunde J.C.B. Ojo, D.K. Orwa, and C.M.B. Utete, African International Relations (London: 
Longman, 1985). 
12 Jonathan T. Reynolds, Sovereignty and Struggle: Africa and Africans in the Era of the Cold War 
1945–1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
13 Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981); also see 
Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), France notably supplied weapons to the Biafran secessionists during the Nigerian civil war in the 
late 1960s. 
14 S.A. Akintoye, Emergent African States (London: Longman, 1976); Christian P. Potholm, The 
Theory and Practice of African Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979). Also see Jean-
François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993). 
15 Olajide Aluko, ed., The Foreign Policies of African States (Sevenoaks UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1977); Stephen Wright, ed., African Foreign Policies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Bruce E. 
Arlinghaus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986). 
16  Douglas Rimmer, ed., Africa 30 Years On (London: Royal African Society, 1991); Martin 
Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus, 2005); Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, How 
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countries as debt sapped economic performance. The end of the Cold War at the turn of 
the 1990s weakened whatever leverage African states had possessed in playing off 
different sides, and left them to fend for themselves in their weakened condition against 
stark neoliberal policies imposed by these international financial institutions and the 
United States as the apparent unipolar power.17 As Young observed, “State crisis is not 
a passing moment in the life of the African polity, but is instead a long-term condition. 
This simple fact alters the basic frame of social action and interaction within which the 
ongoing dynamics of identity transaction and construction occur.”18 Numerous factors 
continue to shape and influence communal identity, which itself fluctuates in meaning 
and influence. 
As part of this neoliberal ideology of development, different institutions and forms 
of cooperation within the continent began to emerge. The European Union’s Lomé 
conventions, a non-reciprocal Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), gave way in 2000 to 
European Partnership Agreements (EPAs), through which economic relations were 
more reciprocal and less supportive of African economies. The United States developed 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), also in 2000, which promoted growth 
in trade and pushed for effective governance through liberalization and reforms. Talk of 
continental free trade and an African Economic Community (AEC) resurfaced and 
aspirations were revived. The outdated and unsuccessful OAU was jettisoned and a 
new African Union born in 2002, potentially in a better place to promote African 
cooperation and greater unified policy. Discussions of more viable African institutions 
and potentially more unified foreign policies were back on the agenda.19 
African Foreign Policy: From the OAU to the AU 
It is instructive to consider the various steps that have taken place in the winding road 
toward a prospective African foreign policy. The Manchester Pan-African Congress in 
1945, as already mentioned, provided an important framework for ideas regarding the 
push for African independence. Participants at the Congress, however, were present 
primarily in an individual capacity, and the Congress had no official status to establish 
any kind of binding policy. The establishment of the OAU in 1963 came after significant 
debate between rival sets of countries and initiatives, as mentioned earlier. The minority 
group favored a radical perspective of closer continental union, Pan-Africanism and 
shared values, and a concerted continental foreign policy, but that group lost out to the 
                                                                                                                                             
Can Africa Survive? (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa and 
the Modern World (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1986). 
17  Sola Akinrade and Amadu Sesay, eds., Africa in the Post-Cold War International System 
(London: Pinter, 1998); also Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, eds., African Foreign Policies: 
Power and Process (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 
18 Crawford Young, “Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?” World Politics 54 (July 
2002), 557. 
19 Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, 
Security, and Governance (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2008). Fifty-five states are members of the African 
Union, following the readmission of Morocco in January 2017 after a thirty-three year absence. 
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majority, which supported national rights, territorial integrity, and the acceptance of the 
status quo as left by departing colonial powers. The prevailing sentiment among most 
African leaders was that it was too soon after colonial rule for countries that were 
building national identity to cede sovereignty to a Pan-African federation. In short, 
nationalism trumped continental Pan-Africanism. 
The OAU was established, then, as an inter-state organization with minimal 
capabilities, rather than as a nascent continental union. It enshrined the territorial 
integrity of frontiers as constructed during colonialism, the non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of other states, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The latter was 
made difficult by the first two principles, as problems surfaced over contested borders 
and the poor performance of governments. The OAU survived for close to forty years, 
but rarely inspired belief that it was actually a continental union, except perhaps for 
binding members against continuing colonization and apartheid in South Africa.20 But 
the fact that the OAU managed to remain in existence is an achievement given the 
inherent divisions across the continent on linguistic, ideological, and religious lines, as 
well as schisms between African states along landlocked versus coastal, democratic 
versus non-democratic, and pro-socialist versus pro-capitalist fault lines. 
Some landmark successes of the OAU include support for the front-line states 
(FLS) in the push for decolonization and ending apartheid, and the encouragement 
given to the development of a number of regional economic communities (RECs). The 
Lagos Plan of Action was launched in 1980 as a powerful declaration of neoliberal intent 
to promote African economic cooperation and trade, attempting to move the continent 
towards enhanced development.21 The Lagos Plan launched ideas for an AEC and 
Common Market, neither of which has been achieved to date. The rhetoric of the OAU 
did not match its action, unfortunately, and the organization languished and became 
increasingly ineffectual and outmoded in the 1990s. This hampered African cooperation 
to the extent that a new organization was considered vital to move the continent 
forward. The African Union (AU) replaced the OAU in 2002 with much fanfare and a 
significant push toward more continent-wide cooperation. New institutions for security 
cooperation were instituted, and a fresh initiative in continental economic cooperation 
and development was begun via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD).22 African states were pulled together in helping to shape and enact the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) during 2000–2015, as well as set the new 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) launched in September 2015. 
                                            
20 Elenga M’buyinga, Pan-Africanism or Neo-Colonialism: The Bankruptcy of the OAU (London: 
Zed, 1982). 
21  Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000 (Addis Ababa: 
Organization of African Unity, 1980). 
22 Alex De Waal, “What’s new in the ‘New Partnership for Africa’s Development?’” International 
Affairs 78, 3 (2002), 463–75; also Todd J. Moss, African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and 
Actors (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007). 
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It is difficult to gauge the extent to which African states themselves were driving 
the closer harmonization of policy, or whether they were simply responding to the 
initiatives of their key global partners, such as the European Union, China, and the 
United States. The latter group all appeared to have strategies calculated for dealing 
with Africa, but it was evident that the continent was less organized with a coordinated 
policy of its own. Calls continue for greater harmonization of policy, including plans for a 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and an AEC, including a common currency for the 
continent.23 The latest plan from the AU, Africa 2063, lays out possible pathways for the 
next fifty years, including the idea of a potential continental union and common African 
foreign policy.24 Before discussing these future plans, we turn to an analysis of African 
policy toward key external partners in order to understand the nature and limits of a 
single African continental identity and foreign policy. 
Africa on the Global Stage 
Africa has always been an important participant in the global economy, though in recent 
centuries has arguably played the role of a vulnerable, marginalized actor within it. 
Slavery and colonization indicate such a status, but some argue that 
underdevelopment, dependency, insurgency, fragility, and poor governance continue to 
undermine the continent’s potential in the contemporary global economy.25 In contrast, 
others point to evidence of an uptick in African economic performance, and a focus on 
the economic potential that the continent has to offer (somewhat reminiscent of the 
optimism of the 1960s), encapsulated within the Africa Rising movement.26 As Hugon 
noted, “Africa is now coveted by emerging powers and also by industrial powers for its 
resources … and for a market that, from 900 million people in 2010, should reach two 
billion people in 2050.”27 There is a new social construction of Africa emerging with 
dynamic centers of economic and telecommunication growth, rather than as a perceived 
                                            
23 These objectives had been built into the Preamble and Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of 
July 2000, for the founding of the African Union; see K. Mathews, “Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The 
African Union,” India International Centre Quarterly 31, 4 (Spring 2005), 143–55; the full Act can be 
accessed at https://au.int/web/en/constitutive-act. 
24 The AU’s Agenda 2063 can be accessed at https://au.int/web/en/agenda2063. 
25 Shantayanan Devarajan and Wolfgang Fengler, “Africa’s Economic Boom: Why the Pessimists 
and the Optimists are Both Right,” Foreign Affairs 92, 3 (May/June 2013), 68–81; George B. N. Ayittey, 
Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Martin 
Meredith, The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2005); Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
26 Vijay Mahajan, Africa Rising (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2009); Robert Rotberg, Africa 
Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Jonathan 
Berman, Success in Africa: CEO Insights from a Continent on the Rise (Brookline, MA: Bibliomotion, 
2013). 
27 Philippe Hugon, “Cooperation: New Players in Africa,” in Africa: 50 Years of Independence 
(Geneva: The Graduate Institute, 2010), 98. 
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basket case of impoverished states. African states have numerous complex and 
important economic global ties, but for space considerations we are selecting three 
short case studies here. These represent the three largest trade partners of the African 
continent over recent decades, as well as important political partners, though we do 
acknowledge that relations with Brazil, India, and Middle Eastern countries are of 
growing significance.28 
We assess Africa’s relationship with the European Union, the United States, and 
China, both to understand these important partnerships for the continent but also to 
consider the extent to which African countries exhibit some form of united/continental 
policy and identity when dealing with these partners.  Although bilateral and multilateral 
relations exist outside of these formal partnerships, a significant element of the 
relationship with the EU is handled through the Cotonou and Lisbon Agreements, with 
the US through the AGOA treaty, and with China in the five-year Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) summits. These organizational arrangements do not always 
forge common African agendas, but they do at least provide important avenues and 
opportunities for the coordination of African foreign and foreign economic policies. 
The European Union (EU) 
Relations with Europe remain very important. As African states attempted to break from 
colonial bonds in the 1960s, the Yaoundé Convention provided a mechanism to 
maintain preferential trade linkages between Africa and Europe. This was superseded 
by the Lomé Convention in 1975, and four successive agreements maintained 
preferences down to 2000. Interestingly, Europe separated out its relations with North 
Africa from the 1970s onwards, and consolidated these within its Euro-Mediterranean 
Policy in 1995—an important social construction of a greater Europe around the 
Mediterranean Sea. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was pulled into the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) states, as a bloc of essentially poorer, developing states. As Lomé 
was eventually considered to be in breach of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, 
particularly the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle, it was replaced by more reciprocal 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under the Cotonou Agreement in 2000.29 
The EPAs aim to promote EU-ACP trade, sustainable economic growth, and 
poverty alleviation. The EU has been negotiating the EPAs on a bilateral basis with 
seven sub-groups of the ACP, five of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa.30 Of the five 
SSA sub-groups, the EU has wrapped up negotiations and/or signed full agreements 
                                            
28 Africa’s top partners in total trade (combined exports and imports) in 2015 were the European 
Union (Euro Area) at $221 billion, China at $136 billion, and the United States at $45 billion, as contained 
in Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2016). For additional 
information on India’s trade with Africa, see Pavithra Rao and Franck Kuwonu, “India, Africa Rekindle 
Trade Ties,” Africa Renewal (August–November 2016), 4–5. 
29 Olufemi Babarinde and Gerrit Faber, eds., The European Union and the Developing Countries: 
The Cotonou Agreement (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). 
30 The five SSA groups are Central Africa, East African Community (EAC), East and Southern Africa 
(ESA), South African Development Community (SADC), and West Africa. 
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with three and concluded interim agreements with five member states of the remaining 
two groups.31 Rather than negotiate a single agreement with the entire SSA group, or 
with the entire African continent, the EU has insisted on negotiating with individual sub-
groups (in some cases, with individual countries), thereby undermining African 
continental cohesion and lobbying, at least through the ACP, that had been a feature of 
Lomé. As Chinese influence grew in Africa, eroding the EU’s pre-eminence, Europe 
responded with the Lisbon Treaty, signed in 2007, on a Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) 
to enhance its partnership with African states.32 Significant efforts are being made to 
assist African states in development and shore up European influence and trade, but 
both are being undermined by the strength of Chinese involvement in the continent and 
its willingness to avoid political and human rights strings to its assistance and 
investments. 
The United States 
The United States has historically perceived Africa as a European theater of action, but 
had specific security interests in the continent during the Cold War (such as its 
involvement in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s). The use of eastern Africa as a 
springboard to the Middle East was important for creating a Rapid Deployment Force 
during the Carter and Reagan administrations, especially following the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. During the 1990s, American interest in the continent wavered from a realist 
perspective on security to a more neoliberal focus on development strategies, but the 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), coupled with earlier attacks 
on American embassies in East Africa in 1998, brought security interests back to full 
prominence. The events of 9/11 superseded security problems in Somalia in the 1990s, 
which led to a US retreat from there, along with the August 1998 attacks on American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.33 The creation of the African Command, based in 
Stuttgart, by President George W. Bush in October 2007, along with later deployment of 
various American training forces in the continent under President Obama, helped to 
identify the key security strands and the increased militarization of United States-Africa 
relations, at times to the detriment of good governance.34 
                                            
31 The EU has concluded full EPAs with EAC, SADC, and West Africa (ECOWAS), although none of 
the agreements has been ratified, and has concluded interim agreements with Cameroon, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe. The EU has concluded full EPAs with EAC, SADC, and West 
Africa (ECOWAS), although none of the agreements has been ratified, and has concluded interim 
agreements with Cameroon, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/).  
32 Jack Mangala, ed., Africa and the European Union: A Strategic Partnership (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013); Maurizio Carbone, ed., The European Union in Africa: Incoherent Policies, 
Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
33 Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2006). 
34  Nicholas Van de Walle, “US Policy Towards Africa: The Bush Legacy and the Obama 
Administration,” African Affairs 109, 434 (2010), 1–21; Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy 
Toward Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Princeton N. Lyman and Patricia Dorff, 
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On the economic front, the administration of Bill Clinton opened a new 
partnership in May 2000 through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This 
brought together thirty-nine African states in a partnership to promote trade 
opportunities for the continent in the US market. This agreement has brought only 
modest benefits to its African members, and some 90 percent of the AGOA trade 
volume consists of African oil exports to the United States.35 AGOA was due to expire in 
September 2015, and after several years of concerted pressure and lobbying by its 
African member states in a united foreign policy stance, along with support from the 
Obama administration, the agreement was eventually renewed by the US Congress 
with a few months to spare. The impact of not signing an extension would have been 
significant to African trade and economic development.36 
Less than 1 percent of US total trade involves Africa today, with a similar 
percentage of US foreign direct investment there also. The hopes held by many in 
Africa that Barack Obama, the son of a Kenyan father, would ignite the diaspora and 
place Africa on the US map have been largely unfulfilled to the dismay of many 
Africans. The fact that the first-ever summit of African leaders with an American 
President only took place in August 2014—approximately two years before the end of 
Obama’s eight-year tenure (in contrast to the ongoing summits held by the EU and 
China) appears to confirm the low priority of Africa to the United States, and indicates a 
potential lost opportunity for US policy to engage further with the continent. 
China 
In contrast, China’s relations with the continent have been booming for the last decade 
or more, to the extent that since 2009 China is Africa’s largest trading partner and 
investor. Much of the trade involves investment in infrastructure by the Chinese in return 
for African commodities. A large number of buildings and infrastructure projects in the 
continent have been funded and built by the Chinese, including the new African Union 
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. China’s no-strings trade and development 
policies provide welcome relief to African states tired of the human rights conditions of 
European and US programs, and in turn have jolted European complacency in Africa.37 
There are still many in Africa (and in Europe and the US) who have qualms about what 
is sometimes referred to as new Chinese colonialism, and so there is not universal 
                                                                                                                                             
eds., Beyond Humanitarianism: What You need to Know about Africa and Why it Matters (New York: 
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conformity to an African foreign policy of open support for China.38 Some analysts do 
not see an underlying Chinese strategic role in Africa, and argue that programs are 
driven by commercial interests primarily.39  Other scholars see Chinese investment as 
very positive for the continent.40 
Although China had been a player in the continent during the Maoist days of the 
1960s and 1970s (or even earlier) providing student scholarships as well as funding to 
liberation movements—notably in the Angolan civil war—there are far less historical ties 
and baggage in Africa-China relations, and little of any African diaspora in China to 
mention besides “Chocolate City” in Guangzhou (the largest African community in Asia). 
What is interesting to follow is the more than one million Chinese settlers in Africa, and 
how that diaspora may affect Chinese relations with the continent in the future. To date, 
African states are fairly unified in a policy supporting trade with China, and also enjoy 
whatever leverage that provides them in their relationship with the EU and the United 
States. 
Toward an African Foreign Policy? 
What conclusions can we draw about coordinated African policies from this brief 
historical examination of Africa’s relations with these external actors? The fact that 
these relations have fluctuated over recent decades is to be expected, but also shows 
that there are no easy conclusions. All three external players have their own 
coordinated policies toward Africa, but African states are clearly less coordinated in their 
strategies. None of the relationships could be considered as between equals, and the 
political conditionality of policy by the EU and the United States often divides African 
states. Despite Africa having eight RECs along with the AU as facilitators of common 
policy, African states are normally involved in asymmetrical bi-lateral negotiations, 
which place them at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis their external partner. Strengthening 
RECs in the continent would be an important first step in helping Africa with these 
external relationships, and in the foreseeable future that is probably the most 
reasonable hope and strategy.41 
To what extent has the African continent exerted leverage in international 
organizations? With fifty-five states, the numerical weight of the continent provides a fair 
degree of influence—more than one-quarter of the membership/votes in the United 
Nations is African. And yet, even when the continent has unified platforms, it has been 
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unable to exert much influence. The continent has been active in groupings of 
developing states, such as the earlier Nonaligned Movement taking shape after the 
Bandung Conference in 1955, as well as the Group of Seventy-Seven formed in 1964. 
The AU is an advocate of South-South cooperation, but with the exception of China and 
India, and to a lesser extent Brazil, this has not brought significant benefit to the 
continent to date in terms of trade, though that is slowly changing. Even when united, 
however, Africa has little to no leverage in organizations such as the World Bank and 
IMF, essentially because of the continent’s small economies. The activities of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) have largely focused on Africa—indicting two sitting 
heads of state in Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir and Cote d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo—and this 
undermines Africa’s stature in the world, but interestingly has helped unify the continent 
against the ICC and associated international bodies. Similarly, many African states are 
unified in their calls for greater assistance with climate change and mitigation, but that 
unity has brought little success with international partners. 
We have witnessed the development of regional powers, such as Nigeria and 
South Africa (with the former included in MINT and the latter added to BRICS), which by 
themselves attract global attention, but those countries have been unable to leverage 
their assets over recent decades into more influence for the continent as a whole.42 The 
Arab Spring has also inhibited the continent in promoting a more forceful unity. The fact 
that unsettled countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are prominent members of 
the AU—as well as African RECs—undermines the call to a united policy in many 
arenas. Ongoing insecurity in and around the Horn of Africa also weakens continental 
initiatives. It is to those regional policies that we now turn. 
Pax-Africana and African Regionalism 
How have historical developments affected events today in terms of regional identity, 
cooperation, and common external policies? What are the current economic 
partnerships within and between the regions, and how effective is the AU in harnessing 
common strategies? Can we discern common policies and a shared sense of identity? 
To try to answer these questions, we address continental cooperation and the role of 
the AU, and then turn to consider the efforts of the continent’s eight RECs and their 
attempts to create a single AEC. Finally, we point to current issues facing the continent 
that are limiting further integration. 
The inception of the AU in 2002 reinvigorated efforts at continental cooperation 
and drew a line under the rather feeble and disappointing activities of the OAU in 
previous decades. New structures and goals were set in place, notably an emphasis on 
promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, security, and sustainable 
development. New institutions were established, going beyond the traditional scope 
previously adopted by the OAU. These included a Pan-African Parliament, an African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights, a Peace and Security Council, and an Economic, 
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Social, and Cultural Council.43 Some pointed to the fact that the AU was copying the 
structure of the EU, even going beyond it in terms of security. One could critique this 
within a post-colonial lens as setting out to mimic Western institutions, or perceive it as 
a response to neoliberal pressures. One could also make a case that we are witnessing 
a neo-modernization strategy unfolding for the continent, with RECs trying to follow the 
best practices of the EU. 
Critics argue that these changes have largely been cosmetic, and have not 
altered the underlying economic and political features of the continent. Why, in fact, 
does the continent want or need continental cooperation? It is instructive that the AU’s 
Constitutive Act of 2000 is not explicit in its support for an African foreign policy, 
although there is implicit support for defending common African interests, including a 
more forceful role in the global economy.44 It is difficult to see how that can be achieved 
without closer integration within the RECs and the continent as a whole. 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), adopted by the OAU in 
2001, aims to provide positive impetus to African development, highlighting the 
impressive growth potential of the continent and the opportunities for global partnership, 
rather than the unimpressive record of the 1980s and 1990s and the accumulated 
continental debt. But NEPAD is structured with a neoliberal economic philosophy in 
mind, shaped by external economic forces rather than the shared will of the continent. 
Likewise, the new African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) requires African states to 
be judged by their peers on their human rights and social records, even though many 
members have major blemishes on their own records. 45  The AU also has been 
instrumental in attempting to raise Africa’s development agenda to meet the MDGs and 
SDGs. In some of these goals, such as with education, the continent has been fairly 
successful, but it still lags behind the rest of the world in many indicators. 
In terms of peacekeeping and security, the AU has been more active in 
attempting to intervene in some of the continent’s most pressing crises, such as in 
Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Decades earlier, Mazrui had called for a Pax-
Africana, and argued that, “There is a crying need in the continent for collective military 
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self-reliance.”46 The OAU agreed in 1997 to create an African Defense Force, but it was 
never implemented. The AU has established on paper a security structure unmatched 
by any other regional organization (with the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, NATO). This is not so much a plan for an African army, but is based upon 
sub-regional standby forces that get deployed in regional theaters, such as Somalia and 
northern Nigeria.47 But resources and the resolve are not sufficient to make real 
differences in these conflicts, and in many ways the AU seems as limited as the OAU 
before. The AU has also been hamstrung on other controversial issues, such as the 
Arab Spring impacting its northern member-states, or the activities of the ICC, or 
questionable governance practices in some of its members. However, in this regard, it is 
not necessarily any worse than other international organizations. 
The continent possesses eight RECs, some with fairly impressive credentials and 
history. The East African Community (EAC, originally founded in 1967, then revived in 
2000), the Southern African Development Community (SADC, founded in 1980), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, founded in 1975), and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, founded in 1994, replacing 
the Preferential Trade Area formed in 1981)—which includes Egypt and Libya as 
members—are prominent trade organizations that have registered some economic 
successes. But the challenges facing these organizations are numerous, not least of 
which is finding the necessary political will among the national members to promote 
regional cooperation. There is little if any regional identity developing within these 
RECs. Limited resources hamper them all, along with relatively poor infrastructure to 
move goods within regions, and often less than inviting business climates. The paucity 
of the regulatory environment also tends to limit further growth. Fifteen of the continent’s 
countries are landlocked, raising transaction costs which are, on average, the highest of 
any region in the world.  Intra-regional trade in most African RECs hovers around 10–12 
percent (as opposed to about 60 percent in the EU), and has stubbornly resisted 
growth. Africa’s contribution to world trade has actually dropped, going from 8 percent in 
1948 to 3.3 percent in 2010, although its total trade volume has increased over the 
same period.48 
Since an initial meeting in Kampala in 2008, an important neoliberal initiative has 
worked to unite the EAC, SADC, and COMESA into a Tripartite Free Trade Area. The 
Tripartite FTA was officially launched in June 2015, potentially leading to full integration 
of these RECs in the near future. This plan to bring together three of the best 
performing RECs into an FTA encompassing twenty-six countries with a combined 
population of 632 million contributing 58 percent of Africa’s GDP is an important 
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stepping stone on the way to a single AEC. It is also a vital way to expand economic 
capacity and put the continent on a more competitive footing within the global economy 
by providing economies of scale and regionally-integrated markets. Smoother regional 
supply chains would certainly benefit countries and consumers, and are important to 
attract investment from external trade partners. But there is still a long way to go to 
improve and link the continent’s transportation routes, irrespective of whether there is 
the political will and economic resources to do so.49 And yet, as we will see in our 
concluding section, the continent is progressing and there are hopeful signs to monitor. 
Prospects for African Identity and Foreign Policy 
Africa’s commitment to and implementation of a common foreign policy has fluctuated 
since the 1960s with different levels of emphasis placed on a shared continental 
identity. Today, both have taken on new prominence, partly because of a desire inside 
the continent to pursue more unified policies to promote development and the SDGs, 
but also because of a necessity to promote continental competitiveness within the 
global economy. To some degree, as we have seen, part of the pressure for common 
African strategies, policy and identity emanates from outside the continent, notably from 
neoliberal sources. So we can argue that shared identity and policy may matter for the 
continent in promoting African values, trade, and a louder global voice, but Africans 
themselves may need to be convinced of this.50 Africa’s ability to succeed in these 
endeavors is more likely to be a matter of degree than absolute success, a feature of 
both push and pull forces. So what factors are likely to shape the outcomes and 
construction of identity and policy going forward, and how successful will the continent 
be? 
The main players in promoting a more unified African identity will be the AU and 
the regional economic communities. The push toward greater integration among these 
RECs is likely to continue for both endogenous and exogenous reasons, which is a 
positive development, even though we should not exaggerate homogenized 
development—regions and countries will continue to move at different speeds. 
Infrastructure is vital and, largely helped by Chinese investment, is being built at a fast 
rate. 51  Some of the stubborn political hostilities and ideological opposition to 
neoliberalism and closer integration have given way to a more practical conversation 
about regional integration. Although some of these goals are planned for the long-term 
future, there are hopes that the shorter-term goal of a continental free trade area 
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(CFTA) could be within grasp over the next several years. The first meeting of the AU 
Technical Working Group to promote the CFTA took place in Kigali in February 2017.52 
The combined effects of closer integration, better infrastructure, and increased 
trade provide a momentum to economic development, raising the level of development 
for tens of millions of people, and building support for even greater integration. Whether 
this will weaken national identities and supplant them with some sort of renewed Pan-
African continental identity is hard to say, but it is rather unlikely. Possibly some level of 
shared regional identity could prosper within the RECs, such as with the concept of 
Ubuntu (one’s humanity is connected to others) in Southern Africa, but there is little sign 
of traction for this either.53  Indeed, if one looks at the experience of the EU, increased 
development and security has not automatically helped to foster a European identity, 
and arguably has strengthened national and local identities, as the growing importance 
of nationalist parties illuminates, along with the British decision to exit the EU in its June 
2016 referendum. So moving to enhanced common external policies does not 
necessarily translate into a closer or shared regional identity. 
The most critical factor is the economic performance of the continent. It is 
imperative that countries continue to pool resources, increase integration, become more 
globally competitive, and build development. Trade remains a key element of 
development.54 Success built upon regional cooperation should help in turn to create 
further cooperation, albeit with the caveat that cooperation is not synonymous with 
integration. So what factors going forward will be most important for promoting 
continentalism? The SDGs need strong AU leadership to bring vital development 
benefits, arguably leading to a stronger voice for Africa in the international system, 
through “Pan-African Globalism.”55 The regional engines of economic growth—Nigeria, 
Kenya, South Africa, Egypt—need to continue to bolster growth to make the goal of a 
single market for the continent achievable and feasible, while understanding that these 
regional hegemons themselves can also facilitate distrust, jealousy, and hostility within 
their own regions. 
A marked increase in the return of African citizens from the diaspora—reversing 
the brain drain with their skills, technical knowledge, and investment—is vital to promote 
growth, and would certainly provide more benefits to their home country than simply 
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sending remittances. Education is also critical to promoting a skilled labor force across 
the continent to boost economic development and regional growth. This may be more 
impactful at the regional level than simply at the national level. Building security across 
the continent requires a significant role for the AU, with implications for economic and 
political development. Success here opens up new avenues for trade and integration; 
failure leads to problems at the national and regional levels. Health also remains a vital 
ingredient for the future of the continent. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, for 
example, had significant impact upon regional partnerships, and highlighted the 
weakness of the AU to coordinate policy across the region.  
The Africa 2063 agenda, launched in 2013 at the 50th anniversary of the 
establishment of the OAU, lays out a long-term vision for the continent’s socio-economic 
transformation and an action plan to strengthen regional identity and to operate as a 
more unified continent. It is viewed as part of Africa’s “renaissance,” and deliberately 
calls for a change of attitude and mindset from previous decades. Aspiration Two 
specifically calls for “An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of 
Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance.” 56  Perhaps we might see 
emerge some broader “civilization” goals for Africa, sharpening the focus of what 
exactly the continent stands for. There is no reason why some common policies cannot 
be implemented, a stronger African solidarity and identity brokered, and a vibrant 
African economy developed—along the lines called for by Nkrumah more than fifty 
years ago. But likewise, in such a large and diverse continent, it would be unwise to 
assume that there is agreement about what African values or norms should be, or that 
complete integration is truly possible and, for many, even desired. Is it not simplistic to 
think that the whole continent can garner the political will to come to a common 
understanding and narrative on gender, human rights, governance, corruption, religion, 
economic development, or security—and yet that is what the AU is tasked to do? Can 
continental identity gain salience over national or sub-national identity?57 Can the AU 
avoid the ignominious performance of the OAU? 
How Africans work with each other and the extent to which the continent’s 
political and economic fabric can improve through closer regional integration are 
important considerations. Much depends on events in the next decade, particularly 
involving the AU and a potential African Economic Community. It is important to have 
awareness of historical developments to understand what is possible going forward, and 
it is still possible to imagine this to be a century favoring a more unified and stronger 
Africa, fulfilling some of the aspirations launched at the 1945 Manchester Congress. 
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